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I. Introduction 
In an influential piece published by the American Journal of 
International Law in 1908, Oppenheim opined that the chief task for 
the science of international law was “the exposition of the existing 
recognized rules.”1 He further explained that “[w]hatever we think of 
the value of a recognized rule — whether we approve or condemn it, 
whether we want to retain, abolish, or replace it — we must first of all 
know whether it is really a recognized rule of law at all, and what are 
its commands.”2 Writing in that same journal 75 years later, Weil 
strictly distinguished between the prelegal and the legal, and noted that 
“on one side of the line, there is born a legal obligation that can be 
relied on before a court or arbitrator, the flouting of which constitutes 
 
∗ Postdoctoral researcher, Ghent Rolin-Jaequemyns International Law 
Institute (GRILI), Ghent University (Belgium), Luca.Ferro@UGent.be. 
All online sources were last accessed on September 23, 2020. 
1. Lassa Oppenheim, The Science of International Law: Its Task and 
Method, 2 AM. J. OF INT’L L. 313 (1908). 
2. Id. at 314–15. 
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an internationally unlawful act giving rise to international 
responsibility; on the other side, there is nothing of the kind.”3  
Then, in 2001, the International Law Commission (“ILC”) released 
its (Draft) Articles on the Responsibility of States for Internationally 
Wrongful Acts (“ARSIWA”) with a truism at its core: “Every 
internationally wrongful act of a State entails the international 
responsibility of that State.”4 That wrongfulness flows from an act (or 
omission) that is attributable to the State and constitutes a breach of 
its international obligations.5 The latter can evidently be ascertained 
by “comparing the conduct in fact engaged in by the State with the 
conduct legally prescribed by the international obligation.”6  
The point of these fundamental observations is that (one of) 
international lawyers’ primary task(s) is to determine with precision 
whether contentious State conduct is or is not in accordance with the 
edicts of international law and, consequently, does or does not entail 
international responsibility.7 This simple idea has a long and 
distinguished pedigree. For example, already in the 19th century, British 
uomo universale William Whewell set out to:  
contribute to the formation of a strong body of experts on 
International Law, distributed among the chief countries of the 
world”, such that “every nation would be willing, if not to accept 
the general verdict of such experts, at least to hesitate to impute 
malignity to another nation whose conduct was declared by the 
common opinion of experts in neutral countries to be technically 
correct.8 
 The point of this article, however, is to argue that such an 
undertaking has currently and decidedly taken a back seat in the 
international legal academy, given what Jan Klabbers has labelled the 
 
3. Prosper Weil, Towards Relative Normativity in International Law?, 77 
AM. J. INT’L L. 413, 417–18 (1983).  
4. Int’l Law Comm’n, Draft Art.’s on Responsibility of States for 
Internationally Wrongful Acts, Rep. on the Work of Its Fifty-Third 
Session, U.N. Doc. A/56/10, at 32 (2001) [hereinafter ARSIWA]. 
5. Id. 
6. Id. at 55. 
7. Id. at 31–32. 
8. Anne Orford, Scientific Reason and the Discipline of International Law, 
25 EUR. J. INT’L L. 369, 374 (2014). Whewell was indeed a polymath, 
writing profusely on widely diverging topics such as mechanics, 
mineralogy, geology, astronomy, political economy, theology, educational 
reform, architecture, philosophy of science, history of science and moral 
philosophy. Laura J. Snyder, William Whewell, THE STANFORD ENCYC. 
OF PHIL. (Edward N. Zalta ed., Spring Edition, 2019), 
https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2019/entries/whewell/ 
[perma.cc/HR4F-PLBP].  
Case Western Reserve Journal of International Law 53 (2021) 
Killing Qasem Soleimani: International Lawyers Divided and Conquered  
165 
 
“fragmentation of international lawyers” as opposed (or in addition) to 
that of international law.9 While this article is certainly inspired by the 
appreciation that such a status quo is indeed a sorry one, it will limit 
itself to evidencing that understanding through a single yet revealing 
case study: the legality vel non of killing Iranian Major-General Qasem 
Soleimani by U.S. drone strikes, and the staggering lack of agreement 
on international law’s substance and application in that case by some 
of the world’s leading experts. 
This article is structured in two main parts. First, it sets out the 
facts surrounding the death of Soleimani as reported by media outlets 
and widely relied upon by international legal experts. It then delves 
into the analysis by no less than 15 of them who co-authored 11 legal 
briefs of varying depth. All such briefs tackle, more or less, the same 
overarching question: Was the killing of Soleimani by U.S. drone strikes 
in conformity with the relevant requirements of international law, 
consisting of the jus ad bellum (“JAB”), jus in bello (“JIB”) and 
international human rights law (“IHRL”)?10  
However, as noted above, there was little consensus among the 
experts — if any. The article hopes to better understand why 
international lawyers disagree so spectacularly by comparing and 
contrasting the variety of views in the Soleimani-case and stripping 
down the supporting argumentation to uncover the underlying 
(theoretical and methodological) approach. The article’s second part 
will tackle that preliminary examination. The root of the problem 
indeed appears to lie in a different methodological approach to the same 
issue, which includes relying on different sources and/or interpreting 
the same sources differently. Add to that the law’s supposed 
indeterminacy, the absence of an authoritative arbiter, and 
contemporary academic idiosyncrasies, and it becomes clear(er) why 
each interpretation of international law is seemingly allowed to stand.  
The article ends with some final reflections. Generally, it hopes to 
spark a much-needed debate by identifying a worrying trend in 
international law and taking a swing at offering preliminary 
explanations, rather than present a definitive solution. After all, if the 
“invisible college of international lawyers”11 cannot decide on the 
disputed legality of a State unapologetically taking out the military 
brass of its archenemy on the territory of a neutral country, it is difficult 
to see what remains of the prohibition on the use of force — the 
cornerstone of the Charter of the United Nations and international law 
more broadly. 
 
9. Jan Klabbers, On Epistemic Universalism and the Melancholy of 
International Law, 29 EUR. J. INT’L L. 1057, 1062 (2019). 
10. See generally Oscar Schachter, The Invisible College of International 
Lawyers, 72 NW. U. L. REV. 217 (1977). 
11. Id. at 217–18.  
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II. Case study: The killing of Qasem Soleimani 
A. Facts and context 
On Friday, January 3, 2020 at 12:47 AM, American MQ-9 Reaper 
drones struck a convoy leaving Baghdad International Airport in Iraq, 
killing ten individuals.12 Among the dead were Iranian Major-General 
Qasem Soleimani, chief of the Quds Force and one of the most powerful 
men in Iran, and Abu Mahdi al-Muhandis, de facto leader of the Iraqi 
Popular Mobilisation Forces and founder of the Kataib Hezbollah 
(“KH”) militia.13 Five days later, Iran responded with missile attacks 
on the Ain Al Asad air base, used by American forces to train Iraqi 
soldiers, causing traumatic brain injury to more than 100 U.S. 
servicemen.14 Just hours after that, the Iranian military — on high alert 
for American counteractions — accidentally shot down a Ukrainian 
passenger plane on its way to Kyiv from Tehran, killing all 176 on 
board.15 
Rising tensions between the United States and Iran over the 
previous two years culminated in that deadly week in early January. 
These tensions started with the U.S. withdrawal on May 8, 2018 from 
the 2015 multilateral nuclear agreement with Iran and its policy of 
maximum pressure ever since.16 They included several incidents in 2019, 
 
12. Peter Baker, Ronen Bergman, David D. Kirkpatrick, Julian E. Barnes & 
Alissa J. Rubin, Seven Days in January: How Trump Pushed U.S. and 
Iran to the Brink of War, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 16, 2020), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2020/01/11/us/politics/iran-
trump.html?auth=linked-google [https://perma.cc/A9G2-ADNN]. 
13. Id.; Matthew S. Schwartz, Who Was the Iraqi Commander Also Killed in 
the Baghdad Drone Strike?, NPR (Jan. 4, 2020, 10:16 PM), 
https://www.npr.org/2020/01/04/793618490/who-was-the-iraqi-
commander-also-killed-in-baghdad-drone-strike [perma.cc/U7SG-CGN9].  
14. Iran Launches Missile Attacks on US Facilities in Iraq, AL JAZEERA (Jan. 
8, 2020), https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2020/01/rockets-fired-iraq-
base-housing-troops-reports-200107232445101.html [https://perma.cc/FL5B-
EYE4]; Bill Chappell, 109 U.S. Troops Suffered Brain Injuries in Iran 




15. Iran Plane Crash: Ukrainian Jet Was ‘Unintentionally’ Shot Down, BBC 
(Jan. 11, 2020), https://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-51073621 
[https://perma.cc/TD79-RAY3]. 
16. Kenneth Katzman, Kathleen J. McInnis & Thomas Clayton, U.S.-Iran 
Conflict and Implications for U.S. Policy, CONG. RSCH. SERV. (May 8, 
2020), https://fas.org/sgp/crs/mideast/R45795.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/5KBK-9Z2H]; Six Charts that Show How Hard US 
Sanctions Have Hit Iran, BBC (Dec. 9, 2019), 
https://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-48119109 
[https://perma.cc/252G-K2MN]. 
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allegedly caused by one of the protagonists, such as damaging oil 
tankers in the Gulf of Oman, shooting down an American drone near 
the Strait of Hormuz, disabling Iranian tracking equipment through 
cyber-operations and destroying Saudi Arabian energy infrastructure 
sites.17 
The temperature rose even further in December 2019. First, Iran-
allied forces launched indirect fire attacks against Iraqi military 
facilities where U.S. troops were stationed.18 During one of those attacks 
on a base near Kirkuk on December 27, 2019 , a U.S. contractor was 
killed and several American and Iraqi soldiers wounded.19 The U.S. 
responded two days later by targeting five facilities in Iraq and Syria 
— used by Kataib Hezbollah, to which the attacks were attributed — 
killing 25 militia members and wounding 55 more.20 Finally, at the turn 
of the year, enraged militia supporters stormed and entered the U.S. 
embassy compound in Baghdad, setting fire to some of its buildings.21 
 
17. Saudi Arabia Calls for ‘Decisive’ Action over Tanker Attacks, AL 
JAZEERA (June 15, 2019), 
https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2019/06/iran-renews-ultimatum-
nuclear-deal-oil-tanker-tensions-190615090730002.html 
[https://perma.cc/84HA-6VGY]; Nasser Karimi & Jon Gambrell, Iran 
Shoots Down US Surveillance Drone, Heightening Tensions, AP NEWS 
(June 20, 2019), 
https://apnews.com/e4316eb989d5499c9828350de8524963 
[https://perma.cc/L74K-A94U]; Tami Abdollah, AP Sources: US Struck 
Iranian Military Computers This Week, AP NEWS (June 23, 2019), 
https://apnews.com/f01492c3dbd14856bce41d776248921f 
[https://perma.cc/89MK-WZRS]; Special Report: ‘Time to Take Out Our 
Swords’ – Inside Iran’s Plot to Attack Saudi Arabia, REUTERS (Nov. 25, 




18. Kenneth Katzman, Kathleen J. McInnis, & Clayton Thomas, U.S.-Iran 
Conflict and Implications for U.S. Policy, CONG. RSCH. SERV. 8 (May 
8, 2020), https://fas.org/sgp/crs/mideast/R45795.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/5KBK-9Z2H]. 
19. Id.  
20. Idrees Ali & Ahmed Rasheed, Trump Aides Call U.S. Strikes on Iraq 
and Syria ‘Successful,’ Warn of Potential Further Action, REUTERS 




21. US-Iran Tensions: Timeline of Events Leading to Soleimani Killing, AL 
JAZEERA (Jan. 8, 2020), 
https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2020/01/iran-tensions-timeline-events-
leading-soleimani-killing-200103152234464.html [https://perma.cc/SX3L-
7HCF]; Mustafa Salim & Liz Sly, Supporters of Iranian-backed Militia 
End Siege of U.S. Embassy in Baghdad, WASH. POST (Jan. 1, 2020, 5:30 
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These militia members withdrew on January 1, 2020, leading U.S. 
President Donald Trump to tweet in his familiar bellicose style:The 
U.S. Embassy in Iraq is, & has been for hours, SAFE! Many of our 
great Warfighters, together with the most lethal military equipment in 
the world, was immediately rushed to the site. Thank you to the 
President & Prime Minister of Iraq for their rapid response upon 
request … Iran will be held fully responsible for lives lost, or damage 
incurred, at any of our facilities. They will pay a very BIG PRICE! 
This is not a Warning, it is a Threat. Happy New Year!22 We now know 
that threat was no mere bluster. In fact, the decision to opt for the 
most extreme military option and take out Soleimani was made in the 
following hours.23 
B. A comparative overview of expert analysis 
The growing antagonism between Iran and the United States 
provides the crucial context for a better understanding of the killing of 
General Soleimani — including, importantly, from a legal point of view. 
The following sections set out the analysis on the legality of the targeted 










23. Helene Cooper, Eric Schmitt, Maggie Haberman & Rukmini Callimachi, 
As Tensions with Iran Escalated, Trump Opted for Most Extreme 
Measure, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 7, 2020), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2020/01/04/us/politics/trump-
suleimani.html [https://perma.cc/UQS6-4WUS]. See also Carol E. Lee & 
Courtney Kube, Trump Authorized Soleimani’s Killing 7 Months Ago, 






24. See generally Mary Ellen O’Connell, The Killing of Soleimani and 
International Law, EJIL:TALK! (Jan. 6, 2020), 
https://www.ejiltalk.org/the-killing-of-soleimani-and-international-
law/?fbclid=IwAR3zRXtyYlUr9W7VDLIDZJDK419WjADuGyQnX5CU
Aljri7q1YnzhoLPLerY [https://perma.cc/74CY-KN25]; Marko Milanovic, 
The Soleimani Strike and Self-Defence Against an Imminent Armed 
Attack, EJIL:TALK! (Jan. 7, 2020), https://www.ejiltalk.org/the-
soleimani-strike-and-self-defence-against-an-imminent-armed-attack/ 
[https://perma.cc/FG27-GYMV] [hereinafter Milanovic I]; Marko Milanovic, 
Iran Unlawfully Retaliates Against the United States, Violating Iraqi 
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avoid taking a position in that legal debate, but rather will provide a 
helicopter view thereof. 
On a preliminary note, an author’s position vis-à-vis a subsection 
of international law will not be taken into account unless (s)he has 
taken an explicit position on the lex lata in the Soleimani-case — the 
law as it is, as opposed to the lex ferenda or the law as it ought to be 
— and expanded upon it in some depth.25 In addition, the expressed 
 
Sovereignty in the Process, EJIL:TALK! (Jan. 8, 2020), 
https://www.ejiltalk.org/iran-unlawfully-retaliates-against-the-united-
states-violating-iraqi-sovereignty-in-the-process/ [https://perma.cc/5ESK-
NBVB] [hereinafter Milonovic II]; Adil Ahmad Haque, U.S. Legal Defense 
of the Soleimani Strike at the United Nations: A Critical Assessment, 
JUST SECURITY (Jan. 10, 2020), https://www.justsecurity.org/68008/u-
s-legal-defense-of-the-soleimani-strike-at-the-united-nations-a-critical-
assessment/ [https://perma.cc/2DD5-T46H]; Alonso Gurmendi, The 
Soleimani Case and the Last Nail in the Lex Specialis Coffin, 
OPINIOJURIS (Jan. 13, 2020), http://opiniojuris.org/2020/01/13/the-
soleimani-case-and-the-last-nail-in-the-lex-specialis-coffin/ 
[https://perma.cc/5RJN-NW4F]; Patryk I. Labuda, The Killing of 
Soleimani, the Use of Force against Iraq and Overlooked Ius ad Bellum 




H5xa3T9ddKA_r3naToVvNLICCc0 [https://perma.cc/UC77-B83Q]; Olivier 
Corten et al., The Crisis Between Iran, Iraq and the United States in 
January 2020: What Does International Law Say?, CENTRE DE DROIT 
INTERNATIONAL (Jan. 15, 2020), http://cdi.ulb.ac.be/wp-
content/uploads/2020/01/Iran.US_.Iraq_.EN_.Final_-1.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/JD2C-L934]; Ralph Janik, Soleimani and Targeted 
Killings of Enemy Combatants — Part I: Revisiting the “First Shot”– 
Theory, OPINIOJURIS (Jan. 20, 2020), 
http://opiniojuris.org/2020/01/20/soleimani-and-targeted-killings-of-
enemy-combatants-part-i-revisiting-the-first-shot-theory/ 
[https://perma.cc/K7ES-J5ZC]; Geoffrey S. Corn & Chris Jenks, Soleimani 
and the Tactical Execution of Strategic Self-Defense, LAWFARE (Jan. 
24, 2020, 2:54 PM), https://www.lawfareblog.com/soleimani-and-
tactical-execution-strategic-self-defense [https://perma.cc/7E4P-AFM6]; 
Stefan Talmon & Miriam Heipertz, The U.S. Killing or Iranian General 
Qasem Soleimani: Of Wrong Trees and Red Herrings, and Why the 
Killing May Be Lawful After All, GPIL (Feb. 2, 2020) 
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3530273 
[https://perma.cc/DDF3-BK8P]; Agnes Callamard (Special Rapporteur on 
Extrajudicial, Summary or Arbitrary Executions), Annex: The Targeted 
Killing of General Soleimani, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/44/38 (June 29, 2020). 
25. For example, this excludes incidental commentary to news outlets or even 
the otherwise insightful debate between five renowned experts (Ashley 
Deeks, Jack Goldsmith, Samuel Moyn, Bobby Chesney and Scott 
Anderson) in a podcast-episode on the Lawfare-website. See Mikhalia 
Fogel, The Lawfare Podcast Special Edition: Law and the Soleimani 
Strike, LAWFARE PODCAST (Jan. 6, 2020), 
https://www.lawfareblog.com/lawfare-podcast-special-edition-law-and-
 
Case Western Reserve Journal of International Law 53 (2021) 
Killing Qasem Soleimani: International Lawyers Divided and Conquered  
170 
 
views will be treated in isolation, meaning that an author’s previous 
scholarship will not feature in the discussion below. That discussion 
proceeds thematically, setting out points of (dis)agreement between the 
experts on issues of the jus ad bellum (section 2.2.1) and jus in bello 
(section 2.2.2). Generally, 7 out of 15 experts carried out a 
comprehensive legal review of the military action (in three separate 
opinions).26 Four others focused primarily on JAB-issues, while two 
more zoomed in on the relationship between JIB and IHRL.27 The final 
two discussed the interplay between JIB and JAB, but concentrated on 
the former.28  
As for the most basic question — spoiler alert! — 11 commentators 
argued that the drone strikes (likely) violated one or more rules of 
international law, a conclusion with which only two explicitly 
disagreed.29 The final two experts under review chose not to engage 
with all legal questions,30 making it impossible to discern their position 
on the legality of the military action as a whole. Nevertheless, they did 
opine that Soleimani qualified as a legitimate military target.31  
1. Were the drone strikes in conformity with the jus ad bellum? 
A first JAB-issue concerns the proactive U.S. argument that it had 
“taken decisive defensive action . . . by killing Qasem Soleimani” 
because he was “plotting imminent and sinister attacks on American 
 
soleimani-strike [https://perma.cc/LV7W-8T45]. That discussion set out 
the relevant legal questions but did not (attempt to) answer them nor 
tackle the finer points of the law in much detail. Alonso Gurmendi, 
Raising Questions on Targeted Killings as First Strikes in IACs, 
OPINIOJURIS (Jan. 9, 2020), http://opiniojuris.org/2020/01/09/raising-
questions-on-targeted-killings-as-first-strikes-in-iacs/ 
[https://perma.cc/2ZJ4-VKKP] (“Yes. The American strike against 
Qassem Soleimani was illegal. This is the common conclusion of some of 
the world’s best experts on international law and jus ad bellum.”). Given 
the comment’s brevity, and the fact that the three experts referred to 
(i.e., Milanovic (twice), Callamard and Haque) do not agree on each 
relevant issue, Gurmendi is not counted as one of the experts commenting 
on the jus ad bellum for the purposes of this article, see generally id. 
26. See generally Corten et al., supra note 24; Talmon & Heipertz, supra note 
24; Callamard, supra note 24. 
27. Compare O’Connell, supra note 24; Milanovic I, supra note 24; Haque, 
supra note 24, and Labuda, supra note 24, with Gurmendi, supra note 24, 
and Janik, supra note 24. 
28. See generally Corn & Jenks, supra note 24; Talmon & Heipertz, supra 
note 24. 
29. Compare O’Connell, supra note 24, Milanovic I, supra note 24, Haque, 
supra note 24, Gurmendi, supra note 24, Labuda, supra note 24, Corten 
et al., supra note 24, Janik, supra note 24, and Callamard, supra note 24, 
with Talmon & Heipertz, supra note 24. 
30. Corn & Jenks, supra note 24. 
31. Id.  
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diplomats and military personnel.”32 That raises the question of legality 
concerning so-called preemptive self-defense against imminent armed 
attacks, understood as attacks that have not yet begun. This reveals a 
first schism between commentators.  
On one side are the experts who consider that “the law does not 
permit the use of military force to respond to an alleged plan to attack 
in the future” and note that “no international court or tribunal has ever 
endorsed the argument.”33 On the other we find those who do not reject 
outright a more expansive interpretation in case the situation 
“necessitates immediate defensive action to successfully repel” an 
imminent attack, even if that attack is not (yet) “about to occur.”34 
UN Special Rapporteur on Extrajudicial, Summary or Arbitrary 
Executions Agnes Callamard appears to occupy the middle ground by 
relying on the famous Caroline-formulation, suggesting that “a State 
can defend itself against a current, ongoing attack as well as an attack 
that is imminent, where the attack is ‘instant, overwhelming and 
leaving no choice of means, no moment of deliberation.’”35  
However, all of the experts commenting on the jus ad bellum 
harbored doubts about whether the facts were sufficient to meet even 
 




Mark Hosenball, Trump Says Soleimani Plotted ‘Imminent’ Attacks, but 
Critics Question Just How Soon, REUTERS (Jan. 3, 2020, 5:56 PM), 
https://www.reuters.com/article/us-iraq-security-blast-
intelligence/trump-says-soleimani-plotted-imminent-attacks-but-critics-
question-just-how-soon-idUSKBN1Z228N [https://perma.cc/FL3Z-55KV].  
33. O’Connell, supra note 244; Corten et al., supra note 244, at 11. 
34. Milanovic I, supra note 244; Corn & Jenks, supra note 244. Alternatively, 
Talmon and Heipertz considered commentators had simply been “barking 
up the wrong tree,” since the imminence-argument was “something of a 
red herring.” Talmon & Heipertz, supra note 24, at 6–7. See also Masood 
Farivar & Ken Bredemeier, US Attorney General Calls Imminence of 




35. Callamard, supra note 244, annex ¶ 54; Christopher Greenwood, The 
Caroline, MAX PLANCK ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL 
LAW (Apr. 2009) (emphasis added), 
https://opil.ouplaw.com/view/10.1093/law:epil/9780199231690/law-
9780199231690-e261?rskey=aOGXHq&result=1&prd=OPIL 
[https://perma.cc/YV7K-GYRK]. See also Labuda, supra note 24. (“As 
with the killing of Soleimani, the US would need to show that Iraq – 
specifically Kata’ib Hezbollah – was planning imminent attacks against 
the US.”). While he therefore seems to accept self-defense against an 
armed attack that has not yet begun, it was not the crux of his 
contribution. It is therefore difficult to definitively place him in either 
camp.  
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the threshold set by a broad interpretation of the right to preemptive 
self-defense.36 As always, Milanovic eloquently hit that point home: 
The Soleimani strike is thus … is imminently unlawful. The lack 
of any specific details provided publicly and the disclosure of US 
intelligence that goes against US interests cast serious doubts on 
whether the various factual predicates for lawful self-defence 
could be met even on a generous appraisal of the facts. Similarly, 
the deterrence rationale for killing Soleimani, even if admissible 
in principle, collapses under the weight of its own failure, a failure 
that was easily foreseeable.37 
 A second JAB-issue relates to the reactive U.S. argument that it 
had undertaken military action not (only) to defend against future 
armed attacks, but rather “in response to an escalating series of armed 
attacks in recent months by the Islamic Republic of Iran and Iran-
supported militias on United States forces and interests in the Middle 
East region.”38 According to U.S. officials, this included several 
incidents in 2019: (1) the Iranian take-down of an American MQ-4 
drone in June;39 (2) a threat to the U.S.S. Boxer posed by an Iranian 
drone in July;40 (3) multiple rocket attacks by the “Qods Force-backed” 
Kataib Hezbollah against Iraqi bases hosting U.S. personnel in 
November;41 and (4) the aforementioned42 military exchanges on Iraqi 
(and Syrian) soil in December and (early) January 2020. Moreover, and 
still according to the U.S., this series of attacks took place in the context 
of other threats to international peace and security by Iran, including 
 
36. See Milanovic I, supra note 24; O’Connell, supra note 24; Haque, supra 
note 24; Corten et al., supra note 24, at 10; Callamard, supra note 24, 
annex ¶ 64. 
37. Milanovic I, supra note 244; see Permanent Rep. of the United States of 
America to the U.N., Letter dated Jan. 8, 2020 from the Permanent Rep. 
of the United States of America addressed to the President of the Security 
Council, U.N. Doc. S/2020/20 (Jan. 9, 2020) [hereinafter U.N. Doc. 
S/2020/20]; Corten et al., supra note 24, at 10 (“on a purely factual basis, 
the United States has in no way shown that an imminent attack was 
planned by General Soleimani”); Callamard, supra note 24, annex ¶ 64 
(“the US should have brought this evidence, in a form that protected its 
sources, to the Security Council for public examination. Otherwise, Art. 
51 becomes a convenient excuse for any use of force at the whims of a 
State against another State.”); see also O’Connell, supra note 24; Haque, 
supra note 24 (“The U.S. letter . . . fails to allege imminent future armed 
attacks by Iran.”).  
38. U.N. Doc. S/2020/20, supra note 377, at 1. 
39. Id. 
40. Id.  
41. Id.  
42. See Iran Plane Crash, supra note 15; Katzman, McInnis & Clayton, supra 
note 16. 
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against Saudi Arabia (through its Yemeni proxies) and international 
commerce.43 Since this argument did not feature in the rapid response 
U.S. justifications, and no one is “entitled to ascribe to States legal 
views which they do not themselves formulate,”44 early commentators 
understandably did not address it.45 
Those who did could again be divided in two camps. In the first we 
find Haque who indicated that “the last incident in this series was over 
when the U.S. decided to strike.”46 Accordingly, this “dooms the United 
States’ legal case” since if “one attack is clearly over, then the legal 
‘clock’ resets. If no further attack is imminent, then there is nothing to 
lawfully defend against.”47 While he leaves room for the possibility of 
defending against an “ongoing armed attack that was, if you will, 
arriving in waves,” he closes that door here: “an ongoing series of 
attacks is not an ongoing attack.”48  
Much of that argument was endorsed (at times verbatim) by the 
UN Special Rapporteur, who agreed that “these attacks, to the extent 
that they were directed against the United States, had all concluded in 
the past.”49 And while she too admitted that “a series of attacks, 
collectively, could amount to an armed attack,” the attacks referred to 
were, on the contrary, “separate and distinct … , not necessarily 
escalating, … not related in time or even targets.”50 Moreover, even in 
the latter case proof would be required of “further imminent attack” to 
avoid blurring the distinction between the jus ad bellum and jus in 
bello.51 As such, while both authors cautiously accepted self-defense 
 
43. U.N. Doc. S/2020/20, supra note 37, at 1; Hon. Paul C. Ney, Jr., General 
Counsel of the Dept. of Defense, Legal Considerations Related to the U.S. 
Air Strike Against Qassem Soleimani (Mar. 4, 2020); NOTICE ON THE 
LEGAL AND POLICY FRAMEWORKS GUIDING THE UNITED STATES’ USE 
OF MILITARY FORCE AND RELATED NATIONAL SECURITY OPERATIONS 
(2020).  
44. Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. 
U.S.), Judgment, 1986 I.C.J. 14, ¶ 266 (June 27). 
45. See, e.g., O’Connell, supra note 24; Milanovic, supra note 244. 
46. Haque, supra note 24. 
47. Id.  
48. Id.; see also Adil Ahmad Haque, The Trump Administration’s Latest 




49. Callamard, supra note 244, annex ¶ 61. 
50. Id. annex ¶ 57.  
51. Id. annex ¶¶ 62–63. Callamard continues by stating “[t]he existence of 
previous attacks could be a legal argument for the legality of the use of 
force under international humanitarian law – if an international armed 
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against an ongoing attack that comes in different installments (or 
waves),52 they appeared to interpret very strictly the time lapse 
between the last such installment and the military action in defense.  
The second camp belongs to those who unapologetically endorse 
the “accumulation of events-doctrine” (the Nadelstichtaktik or needle-
prick theory),53 but applied it differently here. Indeed, one co-authored 
legal opinion puts forth that “[i]t is generally accepted that a series of 
limited attacks, taken in isolation, can amount to an armed attack when 
considered as a whole.”54 However, rather than relying on the fact that 
the last incident targeting the U.S. had definitively ended, the authors 
denied the doctrine’s application for three (other) reasons: (1) the case 
facts differed substantively from the precedents upon which the 
doctrine is based; (2) the U.S. already responded military on December 
29, thereby exhausting the possibility of again invoking the doctrine a 
few days later; and (3) a lack of “precise identification and evidence” 
with regard to a connection between the incidents.55  
Another co-authored piece pointed out that the accumulation of 
events doctrine required the successive attacks to be “linked in time, 
cause and source.”56 In the case at hand, and in opposition to their 
colleagues cited earlier, they found that the multiple attacks on U.S. 
troops and installations in Iraq met that criterion and thus constituted 
an armed attack on the United States.57 Moreover, the authors argued 
that in such a scenario, unlike in the case of anticipatory self-defense, 
“prospective armed attacks must not be imminent” as it is “more 
difficult to assess whether a series of attacks is continuing or whether 
it has come to an end with the latest attack.”58 They approvingly 
 
conflict between the states existed prior to the strike. However, the strike 
itself cannot be justified on the basis of retaliation/reprisal/degrading 
forces under jus ad bellum.” Id. annex ¶ 63. 
52. Haque, supra note 24; Callamard, supra note 24, annex ¶ 57. 
53. J. Francisco Lobo, One Piece at a Time: The ‘Accumulation of Events’ 
Doctrine and the ‘Bloody Nose’ Debate on North Korea, LAWFARE (Mar. 
16, 2018, 7:00 AM), https://www.lawfareblog.com/one-piece-time-
accumulation-events-doctrine-and-bloody-nose-debate-north-korea 
[https://perma.cc/7RQS-QBWC]. 
54. Corten et al., supra note 244, at 7. 
55. Id. at 7–9; see Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against 
Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.), Judgment, 1986 I.C.J. 14, ¶ 231 (June 27); 
Oil Platforms (Iran v. U.S.), Judgment, 2003 I.C.J. 161, ¶ 64 (Nov. 6); 
Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo (D.R.C. v. U.S.), 2005 
I.C.J. 168, ¶ 146 (Dec. 19). The last reason does echo the views of 
Callamard. See Callamard, supra note 24. 
56. Talmon & Heipertz, supra note 24, at 8. But see Callamard, supra note 
24, §63; Corten et al., supra note 24, at 7. 
57. Talmon & Heipertz, supra note 24, at 8. 
58. Id. at 10. 
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quoted the U.S. Attorney-General’s interpretation on that point, 
thereby fully disagreeing with authors in the first camp.59  
A third JAB-issue deals with the question of whether the United 
States was entitled to engage in defensive action against an attack, or 
a series of attacks, carried out by Iran through its proxy forces in Iraq. 
All commentators dealing with this issue accepted that a State can be 
responsible for the actions of its proxy under international law.60 Most 
refer to the complete and/or effective control tests as the relevant 
standards, although one confusingly also mentions the overall control-
test.61 The latter was once considered a more lenient (rival) test, but 
has been authoritatively rejected by the International Court of Justice 
— at least for the purpose of attributing actions by a non-State actor 
to its sponsor.62 
Relying on the language of the official U.S. justification in its letter 
to the U.N. Security Council, Haque and Callamard both squarely state 
that attacks by “Iran-supported militias” could not be attributed to 
Iran on that basis alone, even if proven (quod non).63 Other authors at 
least left open the possibility that the link between Kataib Hezbollah 
and Iran went beyond mere material support,64 with some going even 
further than that: “Considering KH’s close ties to Iran, their open 
pledge of loyalty to Iran and the regular meetings with General 
Soleimani, there may be evidence that Iran through its Quds Force 
planned, ordered and controlled the KH attacks on U.S. forces in 
Iraq.”65 While there was thus agreement on this aspect of the law, 
commentators nevertheless disagreed on its application to the facts. 
A fourth and final JAB-issue centers on the location of the 
Soleimani-killing: the Iraqi capital of Baghdad.66 Milanovic succinctly 
described the opposing positions on this matter: 
[Any] justification would have to work against both Iran and Iraq, 
because the strike took place on Iraqi territory without the 
 
59. See Farivar & Bredemeier, supra note 34. 
60. Corten et al., supra note 24, at 6. 
61. Haque, supra note 24; Corten et al., supra note 24, at 6; Talmon & 
Heipertz, supra note 24, at 8–9. But see Callamard, supra note 244, ¶ 60. 
62. Application of the Convention on the Prevention of the Convention on 
the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Bosn. & Herz. 
v. Serb. & Montenegro), 2007 I.C.J. 43, ¶¶ 396–407 (Feb. 27); see 
ARSIWA, supra note 4, at 40–54; see generally Antonio Cassese, The 
Nicaragua and Tadić Tests Revisited in Light of the ICJ Judgment on 
Genocide in Bosnia, 18 EUR. J. INT’L L. 649 (2007). 
63. Haque, supra note 244; Callamard, supra note 244, ¶ 60 (citing U.N. Doc. 
S/2020/20, supra note 377, at 1). 
64. Corten et al., supra note 244, at 6. 
65. Talmon & Heipertz, supra note 244, at 9. 
66. O’Connell, supra note 24. 
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consent of the Iraqi government. Pursuant to restrictivist theories 
of self-defence, such an argument would be a non-starter … Iraq 
was not implicated in any imminent attacks against the US. For 
expansionists, this situation would be analogous to self-defence 
against non-state actors — using force on the territory of the state 
in which the attacker is located would need to be justified by the 
necessity of stopping the attack, e.g. pursuant to an unwilling or 
unable theory.67 
Restrictivist scholars indeed firmly reject military action against a 
State simply because the latter fails to prevent its territory from being 
used as a launching pad for harmful operations against the acting 
State.68 Even if the U.S. was successful in arguing self-defense for action 
taken against Iran, it therefore irreparably failed to justify that 
defensive action on Iraqi soil.69 
Expansionists, however, accept that the “unwilling or unable-test” 
may provide a justificatory route for the United States.70 There appears 
to be two competing versions of that argument. The first, according to 
Labuda, is that self-defense may be invoked to justify the use of force 
“against non-state actors operating in the territory of non-consenting 
states who refuse (unwilling) or do not have the military/law 
enforcement capabilities (unable) to eliminate a threat originating in 
their territory.”71 Applied by analogy to the case at hand, according to 
Milanovic, “the US would need to demonstrate that it had to strike at 
Soleimani when and where it did, that it could not ask the Iraqi 
government for permission (e.g. on the basis of its collusion with Iran) 
and that it could not wait to strike at Soleimani elsewhere.”72 Both 
Labuda and Milanovic then tackle the theory on its own merits, without 
 
67. Milanovic I, supra note 244. 
68. Corten et al., supra note 24, at 8–9; see also O’Connell, supra note 244 
(“In the event the Iraqis failed to take adequate steps, the U.S. can keep 
its people safe by evacuating them from Iraq.”); see Olivier Corten, A 
Plea Against the Abusive Invocation of Self-Defence as a Response to 
Terrorism, EJIL:TALK! (July 14, 2016), https://www.ejiltalk.org/a-plea-
against-the-abusive-invocation-of-self-defence-as-a-response-to-terrorism/ 
[https://perma.cc/YM5H-5V4W].  
69. However, this assumes that KH, as part of the Popular Mobilisation 
Forces, had not (yet) been fully integrated into the Iraqi army. See Corten 
et al., supra note 244, at 8–9. Compare Callamard, supra note 244, § 70, 
with Talmon & Heipertz, supra note 244, at 14 (“The situation here is . . 
. one of a State organ being placed at the disposal of another State. Rather 
than being so placed by the Iraqi Government, though, KH placed itself 
at the disposal of Iran. In this case, the conduct of KH can be considered 
only an act of Iran.”). 
70. Talmon & Heipertz, supra note 244, at 16. 
71. Labuda, supra note 24.  
72. Milanovic I, supra note 244. 
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thereby supporting it,73 but both conclude that doing so is 
unsatisfactory — given the absurd legal consequences74 and because the 
U.S. did not discharge its evidentiary burden.75 
Similarly, Special Rapporteur Callamard noted that support for 
the doctrine is decidedly mixed, but has nevertheless been used 
by States to justify the use of military force.76 Be that as it may, 
she denied that the doctrine could apply in the Soleimani-case for 
three reasons: (1) the ‘threat’ to be neutralized was a high-level 
State official prone to international travel, which would absurdly 
imply he could be targeted anywhere in the world; (2) many of 
the alleged attacks against the U.S. did not concern Iraq, nor was 
it suggested that Iraq was the intended location of one that was 
imminent; (3) there was no evidence that Iraq was unable or 
unwilling to cooperate, given its continued support in the fight 
against Islamic State and the absence of consultation prior to the 
drone strike.77  
Finally, Talmon and Heipertz put forth a different conception of 
unable or unwilling. They first discarded the former conception as 
“highly controversial and prone to abuse,” thereby seemingly agreeing 
with the restrictivist point of view.78 They then relied on the test’s 
“original, so-to-speak” incarnation to preclude the wrongfulness of the 
use of force in trilateral, inter-State relations: “Where a neutral or non-
belligerent State (Iraq) does not fulfil its duties — is unable or unwilling 
— a belligerent (the United States) is permitted to use force in self-
defence on the territory of that State against the enemy (Iran).”79 
According to the authors, that understanding has long since been 
accepted — or was at least left open by the International Law 
Commission in its ARSIWA.80 It was moreover repeatedly alluded to 
 
73. See Labuda supra note 24 (noting that the better view is that this 
controversial doctrine is rejected by most states). 
74. Id. (arguing that applying the doctrine in a situation where the acting 
State is already operating in the territorial State with the latter’s 
permission effectively hollows out the ius ad bellum notion of consent). 
75. Milanovic I, supra note 244. 
76. Callamard, supra note 244, ¶¶ 72–3.  
77. Id. ¶¶ 73–8. Haque, supra note 244 (noting that only clear evidence of an 
ongoing or imminent armed attack by Iran could justify the use of armed 
force in Iraq). However, it is unclear what justification beyond pre-
emptive self-defense against Iran he would accept for defensive action in 
Iraq). See generally id. 
78. Talmon & Heipertz, supra note 24, at 15. 
79. Id. at 16. 
80. Id. at 14. 
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by U.S. officials when pointing to Iraq’s failure in protecting U.S. troops 
on its territory.81 
In sum, commentators disagreed on whether the right to self-
defense justifies military action against attacks that have not yet begun 
(or are not even about to), although none accepted that the U.S. met 
the evidentiary burden of even the most expansive interpretation. 
Moreover, while all of them accepted the accumulation of events theory, 
some authors argued that the attacks had ended and none were 
imminent, whereas others argued the exact opposite. The latter group 
then disagreed about the sufficiency of the connectivity of the past 
attacks to allow the doctrine to come into play. In addition, there was 
no consensus on the nature of the relationship between Kataib 
Hezbollah and Iran for the purpose of attributing acts of the former to 
the latter, thereby (possibly) justifying taking out Soleimani as the 
group’s alleged Hintermann. To top it all off, there were varying views 
on the status and substance of the unwilling or unable-test as part of 
the right to self-defense, as well as on whether Iraq fulfilled either 
criteria. 
Consequently, besides agreeing on the obvious fact that the Trump 
administration failed in convincingly supporting an already tenuous 
legal argument, the strikes’ accordance with the jus ad bellum 
hopelessly divided international lawyers’ evaluations.82 As shown in the 
preceding paragraphs, the analysis often hinges on the application of 
the law to the facts. A different appreciation of the fact pattern 
therefore likely influences the final outcome, which is to some extent 
unavoidable — especially when commentators offer their views even as 
the story is still unfolding. 
Much more worrisome, however, is the extent of disagreement on 
many applicable legal standards: is defensive military action against 
imminent armed attacks allowed under international law? Does 
imminence (exclusively) consist of a temporal element or rather (also) 
include aspects of necessity and causality? Is imminence conceptualized 
in the same way for self-defense against a single armed attack compared 
to a series of pinprick attacks, or does the legal ‘clock’ then tick more 
slowly? At what point of interconnectedness should we view such a 
series of attacks holistically? And as for the unwilling or unable-test as 
part of the right to self-defense: does it apply in a trilateral, inter-State 
situation and/or against non-State actors? Does it constitute the law 
as it is or rather as (some think) it ought to be?  
None of these questions field clear answers, producing a 
kaleidoscope of legal analyses in the Soleimani-case with no indication 
of how to assess their respective authority. That picture becomes even 
 
81. ARSIWA, supra note 4, at 74–5 (“Article 21 leaves open all issues of the 
effect of action in self-defence vis-à-vis third States.”); Talmon & 
Heipertz, supra note 244, at 15. 
82. See e.g., Talmon & Heipertz, supra note 24, at 6–7. 
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more blurry when branching out to other sections of international law, 
as the section below shows. 
2. Were the drone strikes in conformity with the jus in bello and/or 
international human rights law? 
As rightfully pointed out by Christof Heyns, the former UN Special 
Rapporteur on Extrajudicial, Summary or Arbitrary Executions: “For 
a particular drone strike to be lawful under international law it must 
satisfy the legal requirements under all applicable international legal 
regimes.”83 Moving on, then, from the law on going to war (jus ad 
bellum — discussed in the previous section) to the law on waging war 
(jus in bello), many commentators wondered whether the drone strikes 
that killed General Soleimani triggered (or continued) an international 
armed conflict between the United States and Iran/Iraq and were, 
therefore, ruled by the jus in bello.84 Alternatively, the strikes would 
have been launched during peacetime, which would then raise the 
question whether the U.S. violated its international human rights 
obligations by killing no less than 10 individuals, even if that use of 
deadly force occurred outside American territory. 
Again, there was a wide variety of views among the experts. 
Perhaps the most straightforward one held that the strikes ipso facto 
initiated an international armed conflict (“IAC”) and therefore fell to 
be examined under the rules of JIB.85 This flows from the so-called ‘first 
shot-rule’, which prescribes that “[u]nlike in the case of non-
international armed conflicts, where it must be proved that the 
hostilities have reached a certain threshold of intensity … , a single 
attack is sufficient to trigger an international armed conflict.”86 To the 
group of experts examining the strikes according to JIB also belong 
those who considered (or at least did not exclude the possibility) that 
the IAC had been ongoing since the attacks against U.S. troops and 
installations in Iraq began in November 2019.87 
 
83. Christ of Heyns (Special Rapporteur on Extrajudicial, Summary or 
Arbitrary Executions), Report of the Special Rapporteur on Extrajudicial, 
Summary or Arbitrary Executions, ¶ 24, U.N. Doc. A/68/382 (Sept. 13, 
2013). 
84. See, e.g., Corten et al., supra note 24, at 15–16. 
85. Corn & Jenks, supra note 24. 
86. Corten et al., supra note 24, at 16; see also Corn & Jenks, supra note 244 
(“At a minimum, with the first ‘shot fired’—the first missile the U.S. 
launched—an armed conflict between the U.S. and Iran existed.”).  
87. Talmon & Heipertz, supra note 244, at 11–12; Milanovic II, supra note 
244 (“It is now also unambiguously clear that, as a matter of international 
humanitarian law, an international armed conflict (IAC) exists between 
the US and Iran. … It is also perfectly possible that the IAC preceded 
Soleimani’s killing, for example due to fighting between the US and 
Iranian proxies in Iraq.”). 
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Among these experts, some simply concluded that General 
Soleimani constituted a legitimate military target: “Where a military 
officer in command of the forces and capabilities creating the imminent 
threat of armed attack is lawfully and successfully subjected to attack, 
the killing was legally justified.”88 Talmon and Heipertz came to that 
same conclusion,89 albeit after a somewhat more complex reasoning. 
While the strikes triggered an (or, in their view, were part of a pre-
existing) IAC between the U.S. and Iran, the jus in bello was not the 
only applicable legal framework. International human rights law would 
have to be considered also: “both bodies of law are, in principle, 
applicable side by side and are complementary.”90 However, the authors 
denied that Soleimani was under the jurisdiction of the U.S. at the time 
he was targeted by American drones.91 Without such extraterritorial 
jurisdiction, the U.S. was not bound to protect Soleimani’s human 
rights.92 And even if that were to be the case, his right not to be 
arbitrarily deprived of life was not violated.93 Given the context of an 
international armed conflict, that right must be interpreted in light of 
relevant jus in bello standards — as a member of the Iranian armed 
forces, Soleimani was an enemy combatant, and thus a legitimate 
military target after all.94 
A similar analytical framework was adopted by Corten, Lagerwall, 
Koutroulis and Dubuisson: if the strikes “are contrary to the law of 
armed conflict, then [they] also constitute an ‘arbitrary’ deprivation of 
life contrary to article 6 of the Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights.”95 However, unlike their colleagues, they concluded that the 
strikes may have contravened JIB for two reasons: (1) No enemy 
combatant may be killed perfidiously through an ‘assassination,’ which, 
according to some domestic interpretations, prohibits singling out “a 
 
88. Corn & Jenks, supra note 244. See also Milanovic II, supra note 244 (“To 
the extent that IHL applied, both the killing of Soleimani and the Iranian 
missile strike in response were lawful, since the attacks were directed at 
combatants and military objects, in compliance with the principle of 
distinction.”) 
89. Talmon & Heipertz, supra note 24, at 11. 
90. Id. at 12. 
91. Id. at 13. 
92. Id. 
93. See International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights art. 6(1), Dec. 
16, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171 (“Every human being has the inherent right 
to life. This right shall be protected by law. No one shall be arbitrarily 
deprived of his life.”) [hereinafter ICCPR]. 
94. Talmon & Heipertz, supra note 24, at 11–13. 
95. Corten et al, supra note 244, at 21. 
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specific person on the adversary’s side and request[ing] his death;”96 and 
(2) Soleimani may have been involved in negotiations between Iran and 
Saudi Arabia with Iraqi mediation at the time of his killing.97 If true, 
he was protected from harm given his status as parlementaire.98 If either 
scenario was applicable, the strikes violated JIB and, therefore, IHRL 
also.  
Other commentators were not satisfied by that framework. Janik, 
for example, began by accepting that even isolated targeted killings 
could meet the definition of (ultra-short) international armed 
conflicts.99 But relying on the work of Jann Kleffner, he then suggested 
that this would not trigger the full body of JIB-rules: “only the 
protective dimension of the principle of distinction — the prohibition 
to directly target civilians — should be applied to situations of targeted 
killings of a foreign state’s armed forces.”100 Importantly, lethal force 
could not be legitimized on the basis of military necessity or 
proportionality — leaving such force to be determined exclusively on 
the basis of IHRL.101 Janik then concluded that the U.S. indeed “seems 
to have violated [Soleimani’s] right to life.”102 
In yet another approach, Gurmendi first adopts two premises: “(i) 
a strike that violated the jus ad bellum is arbitrary and therefor 
unlawful under IHRL and … (ii) IHL of IACs applies from the moment 
an attack begins with hostile intent, and therefore the first strike will 
usually occur after IHL is triggered.”103 Rather than assessing an 
arbitrary deprivation of life on the basis of jus in bello, Gurmendi 
 
96. Id. at 19–20; see also Rule 65: Perfidy, ICRC, https://ihl-
databases.icrc.org/customary-ihl/eng/docs/v1_rul_rule65 
[https://perma.cc/59X5-A2HK]; John Daniszewski, Was the Drone Attack on 
Iranian General an Assassination?, AP NEWS (Jan. 4, 2020), 
https://apnews.com/1f914021bc802931059746a5ce8a192e 
[https://perma.cc/JQL7-PSYC]. 
97. Corten et. al, supra note 24, at 20. 
98. Id. at 20; see also Rule 67: Inviolability of Parlementaires, ICRC, 
https://ihl-databases.icrc.org/customary-ihl/eng/docs/v1_rul_rule67 
[https://perma.cc/9NB7-37S8].  
99. Janik I, supra note 244.  
100. Ralph Janik, Soleimani and Targeted Killings of Enemy Combatants — 






103. Gurmendi, supra note 244.  
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connects it to, and makes it dependent on, the jus ad bellum.104 As a 
result, the two tests apply simultaneously but lead to opposing results: 
under JIB the strike is lawful, under JAB (and thus IHRL) it is not. 
According to Gurmendi, which test and outcome prevails depends on 
the analyst.105  
Finally, the UN Special Rapporteur considered that, on balance, 
the jus in bello did not apply at all: “The US and Iran had not been 
and have not been considered to be involved in an IAC before or after 
the strike and the strike occurred in a civilian setting in an area outside 
of active hostilities and in a non-belligerent State.”106 She came to that 
conclusion after considering numerous challenges to the first shot-rule, 
such as: (1) taking all incidents between Iran(-supported militias) and 
the U.S. into account, it was unclear whether there were dozens of IACs 
or a single (on-going) IAC or none at all; (2) most institutional and 
individual commentators stopped short of labeling the tensions between 
Iran and the U.S. as a fully-fledged armed conflict — as did the States 
themselves; (3) the geographical scope of the IAC and, therefore, its 
protagonists were uncertain; and (4) while there may be valid and 
pragmatic reasons to apply jus in bello in this case, it may not be the 
best “‘fit,’ for lack of a better word.”107 However, unlike Talmon and 
Heipertz, Callamard considered that using a drone to take out an 
individual abroad was “the ultimate exercise of physical power and 
control over the individual.”108 Consequently, the U.S. was bound by 
its human rights obligations even if the action took place on Iraq’s 
territory.109 Moreover, she agreed that an act of aggression involving 
the loss of life was necessarily arbitrary.110 As a result, the “course of 
action taken by the US was unlawful.”111 
Again, the discord among commentators was astonishing. All 
agreed that to be lawful, the strikes must not have fallen foul of any 
 
104. See Human Rights Committee, General Comment No. 36 – Article 6: 
Right to Life, ¶ 70, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/GC/36 (Sept. 3, 2019) 
[hereinafter General Comment No. 36]. Gurmendi, supra note 24. 
105. See Gurmendi, supra note 244. Gurmendi Takes the Inter-American 
Human Rights Commission as an example and argues it is likely to take 
the ‘pro homine’-approach, allowing IHRL to trump JIB: “As such, faced 
with two possible routes to decide a case, the Commission would choose 
the one that favors individual rights over state rights. Seen through Latin 
American eyes, Soleimani would have been murdered, not targeted.” Id. 
106. Callamard, supra note 244, § 39. 
107. See id. §§ 15–39. 
108. Compare id. § 40–3, with Talmon & Heipertz, supra note 24, at 13. 
109. Callamard, supra note 24, §31. 
110. Compare id. § 44, with Gurmendi, supra note 245.  
111. Callamard, supra note 24, § 82. 
Case Western Reserve Journal of International Law 53 (2021) 
Killing Qasem Soleimani: International Lawyers Divided and Conquered  
183 
 
applicable legal regime.112 However, some thought that only pertained 
to (part of) the jus in bello, while others considered the answer to lie 
exclusively in international human rights law. Hybrid views also 
existed: certain experts thought both frameworks applied, but whether 
the deprivation of life was arbitrary under IHRL fell to be determined 
under JIB.113 Others disagreed, tying IHRL to JAB: an act of aggression 
involving souls lost is arbitrary by definition.114 Finally, there were some 
who claimed both frameworks applied, but led to opposing results and 
whoever is called upon to assess must decide between the two.115 The 
disagreement by no means ended there. Sub-debates involved the 
extraterritorial application of human rights law for targeted drone 
strikes, the intensity threshold for IACs, and Soleimani as a(n 
i)legitimate military target. 
As announced at the outset, this article does not aim to take a 
position in that legal debate — difficult as that may be. Rather, the 
following sections will launch a preliminary examination into the 
question why commentators, whose expertise is beyond reproach, 
evaluate a similar set of facts so differently all while claiming to apply 
the same set of rules.  
III. Tentative explanations 
A. International law as a (pseudo)science 
Koskenniemi famously wrote that international law is 
fundamentally indeterminate and that, as a consequence, it is possible 
to “defend any course of action — including deviation from a clear rule 
— by professionally impeccable legal arguments.”116 He further argued 
that international law is, therefore, “singularly useless as a means for 
justifying or criticizing international behaviour.”117 His views can be 
situated within the critical legal studies (“CLS”) movement that was 
introduced into international law by the so-called New Stream in the 
1980s.118 The latter inspired a whole range of new approaches to 
international law (“NAILs”), including third-world and feminist 
 
112. See Stuart Casey-Maslen, Pandora’s Box? Drone Strikes Under jus ad 
bellum, jus in bello, and International Human Rights Law, 866 INT’L 
REV. OF THE RED CROSS 597, 619 (June 2012); see 
also Gurmendi, supra note 24.  
113. See generally Corten et al, supra note 244, at 21. 
114. See generally Callamard, supra note 24, §44. 
115. See generally Gurmendi, supra note 24. 
116. MARRTI KOSKENNIEMI, FROM APOLOGY TO UTOPIA 591, 591 (2005). 
117. Id. at 600. 
118. See generally David W. Kennedy, A New Stream of International Law 
Scholarship, 7 WIS. INT’L L. J. 1 (1988). 
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critiques of the field.119 Such critical approaches have since chipped 
away at international law’s claims to determinacy, objectivity, 
neutrality, impartiality and expertise.120 Importantly, the “‘newstream’ 
has become the mainstream” as “critical scholarship is usually taken 
far more seriously than doctrinal scholarship.”121 
Additionally, Bianchi compares interpretation in international law 
to a game, where the players (or interpreters) must secure adherence 
to their own interpretation of the law in order to triumph.122 These 
players have several cards (or interpretive techniques) at their disposal, 
but which card to play and when is ultimately “left to the skills and 
strategies of the individual players.”123 Similarly, while international 
law accommodates a wide range of theories and methodologies, the 
academy now appears to agree that no approach is scientifically 
superior to any other — leaving international lawyers completely free 
to follow their preferences.124 As a result, an author may not be 
criticized for a methodological choice as such, but criticism is certainly 
warranted in case that choice is not made explicitly upfront or its 
intrinsic requirements are consequently abandoned.125 
 
119. See generally JOSE MARIA BENEYTO, ET AL., NEW APPROACHES TO 
INTERNATIONAL LAW (2012).  
120. Jason Beckett, Critical International Legal Theory, OXFORD 




121. Jan Klabbers, Whatever Happened to Gramsci? Some Reflections on New 
Legal Realism, 28 LEIDEN J. INT’L L. 469, 471 (2015). See also Jan 
Klabbers, Towards a Culture of Formalism? Martti Koskenniemi and the 
Virtues, 27 TEMPLE INT’L & COMP. L. J. 417, 417 (2014). 
122. See generally Andrea Bianchi, The Game of Interpretation in 
International Law, in INTERPRETATION IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 35 
(Andrea Bianchi, Daniel Peat & Matthew Windsor eds., 2015). 
123. Andrea Bianchi, The Game of Interpretation in International Law, in 
INTERPRETATION IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 35 (Andrea Bianchi, Daniel 
Peat & Matthew Windsor eds, 2015). For a different analogy, see Jean 
D’Aspremont, Customary International Law as a Dance Floor (Two 
Parts), EJIL:TALK! (Apr. 14–15, 2014), 
https://www.ejiltalk.org/customary-international-law-as-a-dance-floor-
part-i/ [https://perma.cc/69P4-FW3X]. 
124. See also JEAN D’ASPREMONT, EPISTEMIC FORCES IN INTERNATIONAL 
LAW — FOUNDATIONAL TECHNIQUES OF INTERNATIONAL LEGAL 
ARGUMENTATION 179–80 (2016) (“[T]here is no methodological package 
that is, a priori, endowed with more validity or force than another. There 
are just a multitude of methodological packages which, in practice, are 
endorsed by professionals without any of them having any methodological 
or theoretical ascendancy over the other.”).  
125. Id.  
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Moreover, Orford has argued that “[a] theory of scientific method 
is . . . a theory of knowledge . . . is a theory of language and its limits.”126 
While the general commitment to scientific values such as rationality 
and objectivity may be universal, what that commitment prescribes 
concretely in forms of conduct, means of producing knowledge and 
relations to the State is by no means static, similar to the continuous 
development of language — including that of international law.127 
Finally, in a ground-breaking monograph, Roberts collected a vast body 
of empirical evidence showing that international law is understood 
differently in different States.128 Employing the same analogy as Orford, 
she strikingly concluded that international law is “caught between the 
ideal of Esperanto and the reality of both multilingualism and English 
as the lingua franca” and is therefore unlikely to ever be fully 
“international.”129 
The understanding that international law is inherently 
indeterminate, characterized by a methodological free-for-all and 
epistemic flux, and its interpretation the result of strategic choices 
informed by extralegal factors seems to squarely challenge the 
conceptualization of international law as a science by the likes of 
Oppenheim with which this article started.130 It moreover threatens the 
law’s legitimacy and may foster noncompliance.131 Writing in 2019, 
Klabbers lamented that the evolution (broadly) sketched out meant 
that: 
international legal method is no longer about possible ways of 
finding out what the law says but, rather, about possible ways of 
 
126. Orford, supra note 8, at 384. 
127. Id. at 372. 
128. ANTHEA ROBERTS, IS INTERNATIONAL LAW INTERNATIONAL? 325 
(2017).  
129. Id. 
130. See generally Lassa Oppenheim, The Science of International Law: Its 
Task and Method, 2 AM. J. OF INT’L L. 313 (1908). 
131. For example, on semantic indeterminacy Franck commented: “But 
indeterminacy also has its costs, which are paid in the coin of legitimacy. 
Not only do indeterminate normative standards make it harder to know 
what is expected—perhaps because the authorities responsible for the rule 
text were themselves uncertain, or could not agree, or wished to preserve 
flexibility for the future, or just did not see the issue but indeterminacy 
also makes it easier to justify non-compliance. To put it conversely, the 
more determinate a standard, the more difficult it is to justify non-
compliance. Since few persons or states wish to be perceived as acting in 
flagrant violation of a generally recognized rule of conduct, they may try 
to resolve a conflict between the demands of the rule and their desire for 
interest gratification by “interpreting” the rule permissively.” See 
THOMAS M. FRANCK, THE POWER OF LEGITIMACY AMONG NATIONS 
53–4 (1990). 
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doing academic research. International law … is no longer about 
what states do, but … about what international lawyers do. … [It] 
has become transfixed by methodological debates, with each 
faction occupying its own corner and being reluctant to look 
outside.132 
The case study under review exemplifies many of those insights. 
Admittedly, it may be unrealistic to expect authors to set out their 
foundational assumptions — for example on their theoretical and 
methodological approach — in detail at the outset of each piece of legal 
commentary, especially when destined for the fast-paced blogosphere 
(let alone Twittersphere). Regardless, it makes a world of difference 
whether, as just one example, an author is mulling the law as it is as 
opposed to how (s)he thinks it should be.  
Take the opinion of Callamard, expressed in her official capacity as 
UN Specially Rapporteur, wherein she firmly derides as an 
“anachronism” the view that a targeted, extraterritorial killing carried 
out by a State does not engage its human rights obligations.133 That 
interpretation ultimately harkens back to the position adopted by the 
U.N. Human Rights Committee (“HRC”) in General Comment 36 
(“GC36”).134 However, the HRC’s Special Rapporteur admitted that 
GC36 merely suggested that such an interpretation would indeed be 
covered by the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 
(“ICCPR”).135 And while the views of the HRC on the ICCPR may 
have “great weight,” they “in no way” represent a binding 
interpretation of the treaty.136 The issue here is not with the modalities 
of the ICCPR’s extraterritorial application, but rather with its 
presentation as settled law by a high-level UN official whose views on 
the Soleimani-case have been broadcast around the world.137 
 
132. Klabbers, supra note 9, at 1062. 
133. Callamard, supra note 244, § 43. 
134. Id. ¶¶ 40–3. See also General Comment No. 36, supra note 1044. 
135. Ryan Goodman, Christof Heyns & Yuval Shany, Human Rights, 
Deprivation of Life and National Security: Q&A with Christof Heyns and 
Yuval Shany on General Comment 36, JUST SECURITY (Feb. 4, 2019), 
https://www.justsecurity.org/62467/human-life-national-security-qa-
christof-heyns-yuval-shany-general-comment-36/ 
[https://perma.cc/T4LQ-XRV6] (emphasis added). See also ICCPR, 
supra note 933. 
136. Ahmadou Sadio Diallo (Guinea v. Dem. Rep. Congo), 2010 I.C.J. 639, ¶ 
66 (Nov. 30, 2010). 
137. Stephanie Nebehay, U.N. Expert Deems U.S. Drone Strike on Iran’s 
Soleimani an ‘Unlawful’ Killing, REUTERS (July 6, 2020), 
https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-iran-un-rights/un-expert-deems-
us-drone-strike-on-irans-soleimani-an-unlawful-killing-idUSKBN2472TW 
[https://perma.cc/9TZS-ZQ8Q]; US Killing of Iran’s Qassem Soleimani 
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Or take the (currently most popular) blog post on Opinio Juris 
wherein Gurmendi bolsters the IHRL-JAB connection,138 again relying 
on GC36 and the work of Haque.139 The same HRC Special Rapporteur 
on this point noted:  
The interpretation embraced by the General Comment is that the 
term arbitrary deprivation of life in the ICCPR also has to be 
construed in light of other relevant norms of international law. 
Hence, a loss of life directly resulting from an act or omission in 
violation of another relevant norm of international law, such as 
the norms of IHL, jus ad bellum or other basic human rights 
norms, would be regarded ipso facto as a violation of the right to 
life.140 
However, that interpretive move is unsupported by a single source 
in GC36. It is unclear how the HRC came to its conclusion and, 
consequently, why Gurmendi found that view — as opposed to the 
more traditional one connecting IHRL to JIB — to be “the most 
convincing.”141 Again, the issue is not with that position in se, but 
rather with its pretense of hard law and the ease with which a 
fundamental shift in legal doctrine seems to blow past unopposed. 
Another illuminating methodological distinction in the jus ad 
bellum specifically was set out by Waxman (and Corten before him) 
that sheds more light on the documented cacophony among experts in 
the Soleimani-case.142 According to Waxman, 
 
‘Unlawful’: UN Expert, AL JAZEERA (July 7, 2020), 
https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2020/07/killing-iran-qasem-soleimani-
unlawful-expert-200707132312296.html [https://perma.cc/7UQ5-VBEE]; 
Nick Cumming-Bruce, The Killing of Qassim Suleimani Was Unlawful, 
Says U.N. Expert, N.Y. TIMES (July 9, 2020), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2020/07/09/world/middleeast/qassim-
suleimani-killing-unlawful.html [https://perma.cc/TT7H-T64E].  
138. See supra notes 1033–11 and accompanying text. 
139. Gurmendi, supra note 244. See also General Comment No. 36, supra note 
1044, ¶ 70.  
140. Goodman et al., supra note 1355 (emphasis added). 
141. Gurmendi, supra note 244. 
142. See generally Matthew C. Waxman, Regulating Resort to Force: Form 
and Substance of the UN Charter Regime, 24 EUR. J. INT’L L. 151 (2013) 
[hereinafter Waxman, Form and Substance]; Olivier Corten, The 
Controversies over the Customary Prohibition on the Use of Force: A 
Methodological Debate, 16 EUR. J. INT’L L. 803 (2006). For responses, see 
Olivier Corten, Regulating Resort to Force: A Response to Matthew 
Waxman from a ‘Bright-Liner’, 24 EUR. J. INT’L L. 191 (2013); Matthew 
Waxman, Regulating Resort to Force: A Response and Thanks to Corten, 
EJIL:TALK! (May 2, 2013), https://www.ejiltalk.org/regulating-resort-
to-force-a-response-and-thanks-to-corten/comment-page-1/ 
[https://perma.cc/A5QS-ZP29]. 
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[t]o Bright-Liners, the legality of resort to force by individual 
states or groups of states should operate as an on–off switch, 
flipped by the manifestation of readily identifiable factual 
preconditions, not shaded or uncertain assessments. . . . 
Balancers, by contrast, view legality of resort to force as more 
like a dimmer knob than an on–off switch. … Balancers believe 
that use of force beyond that authorized by the Security Council 
should be regulated by flexible standards that take account of 
contextual factors and the various policy interests animating 
international law, and that this approach better reflects state 
practice. . . . To be clear, these two orientations — Bright-Liners 
and Balancers — actually represent segments along a spectrum 
of possible views . . . [and] each incorporates some elements of the 
other’s preferred form.143 
To some extent, the preference for one over another appears 
influenced by the authors’ background and training: “US authors tend 
to situate themselves more within the [second] current, the others (most 
notably the Europeans) the [first]. The correspondence is by no means 
absolute.”144 
One example of that methodological clash in the Soleimani-case is 
the discussion about which elements go into the imminence-analysis 
pertaining to the right to self-defense. As we have seen, some experts 
argued that imminence (at most) relates to the armed attack’s temporal 
proximity: has it already begun or is it about to?145 Others, however, 
disagreed and included elements of necessity and causality, using 
imminence more as a “rhetorical device than a genuinely useful legal 
concept — an armed attack will be regarded as imminent if responding 
to the attack is necessary now, regardless of when and how exactly the 
attack will take place.”146 Both approaches appear to find themselves 
on opposite sides of Waxman’s spectrum opposing Bright-Liners (on-
off switch) and Balancers (dimmer knob).147 
Similarly, the unwilling or unable-test operates as a workaround for 
conducting a targeted killing on the territory of a State absent consent 
 
143. Waxman, Form and Substance, supra note 142, at 15–859; see generally 
Weil, supra note 3. The description of international law as an “on-off 
switch” echoes Weil’s strict distinction between prelegal and legal, id. 
144. Corten, supra note 142, at 822; see also Waxman, Form and Substance, 
supra note 1422, at 153–54, 158–59. See generally ROBERTS, supra note 
128.  
145. Unsurprisingly, Corten & others are the most restrictive. Corten et al., 
supra note 24, at 10. See also O’Connell, supra note 244. 
146. Milanovic I, supra note 244. 
147. See Monica Hakimi, Making Sense of Customary International Law 118 
MICH. L. R. 1487, 1490 (2020) (taking firm issue with the so-called 
rulebook-conception of customary international law — arguably a concept 
more in tune with Bright-Liners). 
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and Security Council authorization. According to Callamard, the test 
was developed by the U.S. and other States since 9/11 and has been 
used to “justify targeting inter alia the Taliban in Afghanistan, and 
ISIL in Syria.”148 Following a balancing approach to the right to self-
defense, it is reasonable to argue in favor of its admissibility if the 
defensive military action was necessary to counter a threat at a specific 
time and in a specific location, taking into account the territorial 
State’s collusion with the enemy.149 Conversely, a Bright-Liner 
considers that such an interpretation is “incompatible both with 
existing legal instruments (no text allows such a possibility) and with 
the consistent case-law of the International Court of Justice.”150  
Stripping down the respective lines of argumentation thus reveals 
a methodological assumption at their core that strategic choices and an 
(alleged) indeterminacy of the international legal language inspires151 
— often with diametrically opposed outcomes. From this, we may draw 
two inferences: first, the influential critical approaches to international 
law propagated moving away from the science of international law — 
as perhaps most famously described in Oppenheim’s seminal article.152 
The logical consequence is that the search for a ‘correct answer on the 
law’ is viewed with much suspicion (if not derision). Second, even those 
professionals that do not travel down that road — and they are plentiful 
too — have become much more tolerant towards the free choice of 
theoretical and methodological approach by their peers. As a result, 
every interpretation of international law becomes equally defensible, 
even if not (necessarily) equally convincing. This much is glaringly 
evident from the Soleimani-case. 
B. The absence of an authoritative arbiter 
The absence of a universally accepted method or institution to 
decide between, or (broadly) rank according to authoritativeness, the 
multitude of diverging interpretations of international law and their 
application to a contentious case reinforces the foregoing. It seems as if 
all interpretations may stand, resulting in the ever-greater 
fragmentation of international law.153 Nor is there an international 
 
148. Callamard, supra note 24, ¶ 72. 
149. Milanovic I, supra note 244; Talmon & Heipertz, supra note 245, at 14. 
150. Corten et al., supra note 244, at 9. 
151. In this case, the indeterminacy could involve the term “imminence,” or 
may be found in the formulation of Article 51 of the U.N. Charter. U.N. 
Charter art. 51 (“Nothing . . . shall impair the inherent right of individual 
or collective self-defence if an armed attack occurs.”) (emphasis added). 
152. See generally Oppenheim, supra note 1. 
153. See generally Martii Koskenniemi (Chairman of the Int’l Law Comm’n), 
Fragmentation of International Law: Difficulties arising from the 
Diversification and Expansion of International Law, U.N. Doc. 
A/CN.4/L.682 (Apr. 13, 2006). 
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arbiter capable of taking on that fateful role. Even the International 
Court of Justice, which comes closest,154 is fully dependent on States’ 
consent to decide a dispute between them and take that opportunity to 
clarify outstanding international legal issues (often in obiter dicta).155 
Moreover, relatively speaking such judgments by the ICJ (or any other 
international court, for that matter) are few and far between.156  
However, the ICJ does rely on “judicial decisions and the teachings 
of the most highly qualified publicists of the various nations, as 
subsidiary means for the determination of rules of law.”157 Generally, 
and in the abstract, it is (supposed to be) the soundness, 
trustworthiness and persuasiveness — or, in a word, quality — of those 
subsidiary sources that determines their influence on international 
law.158 The U.S. Supreme Court in Paquete Habana case phrased it as 
follows: 
International law is part of our law, and must be ascertained and 
administered by the courts of justice of appropriate jurisdiction . 
. . . For this purpose, where there is no treaty, and no controlling 
executive or legislative act or judicial decision, resort must be had 
to the customs and usages of civilized nations; and, as evidence 
of these, to the works of jurists and commentators, not for the 
speculations of their authors concerning what the law ought to be, 
but for trustworthy evidence of what the law really is.159 
In addition, the “teachings” of expert bodies with a globally diverse 
composition, with the International Law Commission as a prime 
 
154. See Alain Pellet, Article 38, in THE STATUTE OF THE INTERNATIONAL 
COURT OF JUSTICE: A COMMENTARY 858 (Andreas Zimmermann et al., 
eds., 2nd ed. 2012) (“[T]he Court remains the most prestigious of all and 
the only one having a general competence for all legal disputes . . . ; its 
status as the principal judicial organ of the United Nations enhances its 
authority as does its composition, both wide . . . and diversified . . . ; its 
organic permanence and precedence in time has enabled the Court to 
elaborate an impressive case law without equal.”)  
155. U.N. Charter art. 36. 
156. See Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Nicar. 
v. U.S.), Judgment, 1986 I.C.J. 14 (June 27) for one particularly powerful 
example of the fact that much of our contemporary understanding of the 
jus ad bellum still relies on the judgment of the I.C.J. in the Nicaragua 
case. 
157. Charter of the United Nations and the Statute of the International Court 
of Justice art. 38(1)(d), 24 October 1945, 33 U.N.T.S. 993. 
158. See Pellet, supra note 1544, at 856 (quoting Von Bogdandy, The Judge 
as Law-Maker: Thoughts on Bruno Simma’s Declaration in the Kosovo 
Opinion, in Fastenrath).  
159. The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677, 700 (1900) (emphasis added). 
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example, carries a greater weight than those of individual scholars.160 
Nevertheless, the work of such a collective often takes years before 
wrapping up. After all, rather than provide play-by-play commentary, 
these institutions play the long game. Furthermore, their views are not 
always adopted by consensus (internal disagreement),161 may contradict 
those adopted by colleagues (external disagreement),162 and also do not 
always clearly distinguish between the codification of international law 
and its progressive development.163 
D’Aspremont pointedly described the state of affairs as follows: 
“the intellectual prison of custom seems to be gradually transformed 
into a large dance floor where (almost) every step and movement is 
allowed or, at least, tolerated.”164 While he was commenting specifically 
on international custom as a primary source of international law,165 the 
same can be said to apply to (sources of) the field more broadly. 
Arguably, the lack of a fire-proof way to distinguish between 
authoritative and speculative interpretations fuels this phenomenon. 
And again, the Soleimani-case supports these concerns. For 
example, commentators were willing to judge the official U.S. 
justifications on their own merits — even if the standards they invoked 
did not accurately reflect international law. Milanovic confronted the 
U.S. position on self-defense head-on by proceeding “for the sake of the 
argument, on the assumption that these expansive positions [espoused 
by the U.S.] are correct.”166 He concluded that “even if we took the US 
views of applicable international law on their own terms, . . . it would 
 
160. See Membership, INT’L L. COMM’N. 
https://legal.un.org/ilc/ilcmembe.shtml [https://perma.cc/7CNR-
AXUW]. 
161. See Georg Nolte, The Resolution of the Institut de Droit International on 
Military Assistance on Request, 45 REVUE BELGE [BELG.] DE DROIT 
INTERNATIONAL [INT’L] 241 (2012). 
162. Compare Final Report on the Meaning of Armed Conflict, INT’L L. 
ASS’N (2010), 
http://www.rulac.org/assets/downloads/ILA_report_armed_conflict_2
010.pdf [https://perma.cc/2HUN-D232],u with Commentary of 2016 – 




[https://perma.cc/SLV2-TUNC]. For the treatment of the comparable 
‘decisional fragmentation’ among international courts and tribunals, see 
PHILIPPA WEBB, INTERNATIONAL JUDICIAL INTEGRATION AND 
FRAGMENTATION (2013).  
163. This is a reference to the ILC’s twofold task. See G.A. Res 174(II), at art. 
15 (Nov. 21, 1947). 
164. D’Aspremont, supra note 1233 (emphasis added). 
165. Id.  
166. Milanovic I, supra note 244 (emphasis added). 
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be difficult to argue that the killing of Soleimani was lawful.”167 
Therefore, while he thought it unlikely that the U.S. could discharge 
its evidentiary burden, it was “not inconceivable that it could do so” 
and the “Soleimani strike [was] thus not clearly unlawful in the way 
some previous military actions of the Trump administration have 
been.”168 Taken together, it remains unclear what legal standard of self-
defense Milanovic himself espouses given his refusal to take a firm 
stance in the debate.169 On the contrary, Labuda noted upfront that his 
analysis took “for granted the expansionist ius ad bellum doctrine 
known as ‘unable or unwilling’ (U/U)” even if “[t]he better view is that 
this controversial doctrine is rejected by most states.”170 Nevertheless, 
he then considered that “since the US is one of its proponents, I examine 
the doctrine’s potential applicability in this post.”171  
But do these thought experiments, reasoning along with a 
justification that the commentator considers problematic under 
international law (to say the least), not inadvertently bolster its 
authoritativeness? After all, the influential report by the UN Special 
Rapporteur did not dismiss the unwilling or unable-test outright and 
merely admitted that “the support for this doctrine is mixed, but it has 
been used to justify the use of military force,” and then continued her 
analysis with “[e]ven if valid, the ‘unwilling and unable’ doctrine does 
not justify the strike within Iraq.”172  
Perhaps, that laissez-faire attitude and refusal to disregard a 
clearly outlandish reading of the law may reinforce the questionable or 
even pernicious view that in the interpretation and application of 
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24, at 9 and Talmon, supra note 24, at 15. A comparable, but equally 
problematic, analytical move takes the official State justification too 
literally. For example, both Haque and Callamard (supra note 24) first 
note that the U.S. justification refers to “Iran-supported militias” and 
then use that formulation to deny possible attribution of militia actions 
to Iran as “‘assistance … in the form … of weapons or logistical or other 
support’ does not constitute an armed attack.” But by taking the official 
justification at face value, commentators may miss the chance to address 
the legal issue at the crux of the case. Haque, supra note 24; Callamard, 
supra note 24. 
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C. Academic idiosyncrasies 
Finally, it is worth considering a more general and pragmatic 
explanation for the fundamental discord among expert commentators 
in case studies such as the one under review. Indeed, perhaps the 
requirements imposed by modern-day academia, to zoom in on just one 
type of commentator, unavoidably lead to a dizzying variety of views 
including on the (substance and application of some of the) law’s most 
foundational norms. For example, Klabbers insightfully noted that:  
The system of incentives that has been put into place over the 
last couple of decades, with its emphasis on quick fixes, on 
quantity and on impact, not only stimulates particular ways of 
doing academic work but also stimulates a particular ethos. That 
ethos is one of drama — high drama. In order to be successful, 
grand claims and big promises must be made. … Research projects 
cannot be proposed merely because one is interested in figuring 
things out; the least that is expected is the promise of a ‘paradigm 
shift’.174 
In addition, Sassòli assessed that the importance of scholarly 
writings has diminished.175 His appreciation of its causes is remarkably 
similar to that of Klabbers and, as they support many of the arguments 
made above, it deserves to be reproduced in some detail: 
[A]n academic career cannot be pursued by honestly describing 
the existing law, but only by suggesting ‘new interpretations’, 
‘thinking outside the box’ or ‘deconstructing’ everything written 
previously. This leads to the impression that a reference may be 
found in favour of any position. The increasing number of 
publications on every imaginable IHL problem, the race in the 
academic world towards a quantitative evaluation of research 
output useful for a career and the need to raise funds for research 
by imagining innovative projects that claim a ‘paradigm shift’ is 
needed all reinforce this tendency. . . . [S]cholars following some 
contemporary schools of international law often proudly refuse to 
state whether their positions reflect lex lata or lex ferenda as they 
consider this distinction to be outdated and irrelevant.176 
Consequently, the intense incentive to produce as much scholarship 
as possible may actually cause the decline of its respective impact. This 
is what D’Aspremont — always great in coming up with a fitting 
moniker — describes as leading to a “wasteland of academic 
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overproduction.”177 Weiler concurs and laments that “everybody is so 
busy writing these days, publishing, self-publishing and then self-
promoting … that hardly any time is left for . . . serious, reflective 
reading.”178 Even more dramatically, he believes that this imposes an 
“immense, self-defeating pressure” on young scholars.179  
Perhaps these are nothing more than loosely connected 
observations — albeit made by giants in the field of international law. 
Nevertheless, the combination of sustained pressure on early-career 
academics to be quantitatively productive above all else and overthrow, 
rather than build upon, established doctrines in international law for 
professional advancement180  indeed helps to better understand the 
explosion of views on some of its most cardinal principles. Perversely, 
in the long-term this may lead to the diminished impact of legal 
scholars. However, none of that should be interpreted as a defense of 
engrained notions of international law on moral or otherwise principled 
grounds. Quite the contrary, convincingly arguing for the progressive 
development of international law first necessitates a clear-eyed 
understanding of the law as it stands today. After all, as insightfully 
put by Hart, “[a] concept of law which allows the invalidity of law to 
be distinguished from its immorality, enables us to see the complexity 
and variety of these separate issues; whereas a narrow concept of law 
which denies legal validity to iniquitous rules may blind us to them.”181 
Conflating those roles would be putting the cart before the horse and 
undermines the persuasiveness of any suggested reform from the get-
go. 
IV. Conclusion 
The issues identified in this article will likely not come as a shock 
to members of the international legal community and, perhaps, the 
international legal community will not think they are problematic at 
all. Doctoral students are warned against gearing research towards 
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clarifying the substance of a primary rule of international law, as such 
research would run the risk of being undercut by equally convincing 
argumentation — the law is indeterminate after all.182  That message is 
ubiquitous and research that plainly describes, elucidates or specifies 
the law is often considered outmoded, erroneous, and, frankly, just not 
that interesting.183 
Be that as it may, this article takes the position that the current 
state of affairs is no cause for celebration either. Indeed, with the 
spectacular divide on the legal appraisal of such visible and 
controversial State action as the killing of Qasem Soleimani by the 
United States,184 the authority of international lawyers is fundamentally 
conquered. When international lawyers as a professional class fail in 
their primary task to determine with precision whether contentious 
State conduct is or is not in accordance with the edicts of international 
law and, consequently, does or does not entail international 
responsibility, States have their choice of expert to cover their actions 
under a veneer of legality. This reduces international law to a fig leaf 
for power politics, making it impossible to meaningfully impact State 
behavior.185 
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reinterpretation of the special Brexit arrangements for Northern Ireland. 
Prime Minister Boris Johnson noted such action was necessary to guard 
against the EU’s “‘proven willingness’ to interpret aspects of the 
agreement in ‘absurd’ ways, ‘simply to exert leverage’ in the trade 
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It may go without saying that the reasons underlying the discord 
among international lawyers require more in-depth examination and 
research than was possible in a single conference contribution. 
Hopefully, however, touching upon some of them here — i.e., 
methodological and theoretical libertarianism, epistemic egalitarianism, 
and academic industrialism — can help to ignite a much-needed debate 
on the issue. In the end, Koskenniemi is also famous for his statement 
that international law is “what international lawyers do and how they 
think about what they are doing.”186 But perhaps it is time to consider 
the opposite point of view and let the law again take precedence over 
the lawyer.  
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